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CAN TAX POLICY BE USED TO
STIMULATE ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT?




RICHARD POMP: Chief Justice Marshall once wrote that "the power to
tax involves the power to destroy." This morning we are going to
examine the 1979 version of that statement: whether the power not to
tax involves the power to create. To put it more generally, what is
the relationship between tax incentives and economic growth at the
state and locallevel?
Economists are fond of reminding us that "there is no such thing as
a free lunch." Recently, however, we have been told that a cut in
federal tax rates will so stimulate the national economy that more tax '
revenue will be collected at the higher rates. To put it simply, a cut
in federal tax rates will produce a free lunch. At the state and local
level this kind of thinking has manifested itself in the use of tax in-
centives, a selective rather than an across-the-board cut in taxation.
Our states, municipalities, and big businesses currently are playing a
high stakes game. The premise of this game is that a healthy state
and local economy can be maintained by providing tax incentives that
will attract new business and support existing business. If a jurisdic-
tion does not meet the going ante in terms of incentives, it runs the
risk that business will relocate to areas offering greater inducements.
It is a high stakes game that pits neighbor against neighbor, North
against South. Many of you are familiar with the game.
The pressure to adopt tax incentives and similar measures is irresist-
ible. State and local officials often feel that they have little power to
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affect their local economies and thus feel compelled to do
something-to do anything. Certainly a policymaker does not want to
be perceived as being opposed to jobs and economic development; no
official wants the blood of a runaway plant on his hands. Clearly no
state wants other states to get a jump on it. It is not surprising, there-
fore, that tax incentives are easy to legislate. They give lawmakers a
feeling that they have done something constructive.
The use of tax incentives is not new. Recently, however, there has
been a rapid increase in the adoption of incentives. Indeed, some
commentators have dubbed tax incentives the new ammunition in the
latest war between the states. Tax incentives clearly are in vogue, but
their use raises a series of nagging questions. For example, do these
incentives work? Do firms really chose a location on the basis of state
and local taxation, or do they base their decisions on other grounds
and then simply bargain with various jurisdictions for the best deal
they can get? What percentage of business costs are actually rep-
resented by state and local taxes? Keep in mind that such taxes are
deductible for purposes of the federal income tax and that businesses,
therefore, do not bear the full burden of such taxes. Indeed, a reduc-
tion in state and local taxes will increase the federal income taxes paid
by businesses to some extent and thus produce the kind of reverse
revenue sharing illustrated by Proposition 13.
How important are state and local taxes compared with other fac-
tors, such as transportation, utilities, climate, the cost of labor, right-
to-work laws, the education and skill of the work force, the size of the
local market, the projected growth of a state, access to raw materials,
and a favorable political milieu? Some would argue that tax incen-
tives, whether effective or not, at least reflect a political climate
favorable to business. Once a firm has decided where to locate, and
these other factors are neutralized, do local and state taxes then be-
come important?
In thinking about the use of tax incentives, what weight should we
give to the effect of tax capitalization, that is, the effect that the level
of property taxation has on the price of land? If the price of land and
the level of property tax are so related that the higher the property
tax, the lower the price of land, then all other things being equal,
property tax differentials will be reflected in the price of land. In
other words, a firm moving into an area with high property taxes
might pay less for its land than it would pay in an area with low
property taxes. The question raised by tax capitalization effects is
whether a high property tax community needs to grant an abatement
or exemption from its property tax as an incentive to new business.
Perhaps it is existing businesses that need the incentive more.
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Because state and local jurisdictions all feel pressure to adopt tax
incentives, what can be gained in the long term if a number of juris-
dictions adopt similar incentives? What role can incentives play if all
jurisdictions offer them? Tax revenue would decline everywhere, and
no jurisdiction would gain any competitive advantage.
Assuming that tax incentives do play a role in encouraging
economic development, will the revenue forgone through these in-
centives be proportionate to the benefit received? What are the be-
nefits to the community when a firm changes its location? Are the
kinds of firms or investments attracted by tax incentives necessarily
responsive to the community's needs? Will the new firm's employ-
ment, investment, and environmental policies necessarily comport
with the needs of the community? For example, will the new firm
bring its own work force with it, or will it absorb local unemployed
manpower-the latter being one of the goals of an incentive? From a
national perspective, we would like to know whether, when a firm
moves from state A to state B, any employment that is created in
state B is merely offset by unemployment that is created in state A.
More generally, we would like to know whether these tax incentives
create new industry or simply act to transport existing industry?
Is it possible that a tax incentive may be shortsighted? For exam-
ple, should a state try to retain its manufacturing base if its future
clearly lies in the direction of encouraging the service industry, a
question that is very relevant in the Northeast. Will the profits of
firms that respond to tax incentives be reinvested locally, or will they
be invested outside the state? Will such firms purchase raw materials
from local firms, or will they purchase raw materials and supplies
from out-of-state firms? The answers to these questions may vary.
Much depends on whether the tax incentive attracts the branch office
of a multistate or multinational corporation or whether it attacts a
smaller, community-oriented firm.
Who really benefits from an incentive intended to encourage capi-
tal investment, such as an investment tax credit? What types of firms
have access to capital? What types of firms do not? In other words,
who is in a position to take advantage of investment tax credits? Fi-
nally, do these incentives merely shift capital from one sector of the
state's economy to another?
Assuming that tax incentives do have some influence on individuals
and firms, how can such incentives be improved? How can they be
refined so that they reach only those firms that offer the benefits that
a community or a state seeks? Should incentives be limited by
amount or duration? Should we incorporate a circuit-breaker ap-
proach into tax incentives and tie a tax exemption to a percentage of a
1980]
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firm's profits? In other words, once a firm has become profitable and
demonstrates an ability to pay taxes, should the tax incentives be
phased out? Under present approaches, a community can find itself
locked into a program of tax incentives long after they served their
purpose. New York City, for example, is currently re-evaluating its
extensive program of tax incentives for industrial and commercial real
estate in the light of its greatly improved market. Other jurisdictions
may benefit by following New York City's approach and by reconsid-
ering whether they must continue to be as generous with their
exemption policies as they have been in the past.
If the benefits that are promised by these tax incentives do not
materialize, how will the lost revenue be made up? A community
may offer so many incentives that it is unable to provide the services
required by the new industry or to maintain existing levels of ser-
vices. Indeed, we have recently seen some school districts actively
lobbying against property tax exemptions. These districts fear that the
quality of existing educational services will be threatened by an ero-
sion of the tax base from the use of tax incentives.
Another question is one of fairness between new businesses that a
community hopes to attract and existing businesses. Is it fair, for
example, to exempt a new hotel from the property tax when an al-
ready existing hotel must pay that tax?
Finally, do tax incentives represent a form of government spending
that is equal in amount to the taxes that would have been collected
without the incentives? For example, any tax exemption can be vie-
wed as if the taxpayer actually had paid the full amount of tax owing
in the absence of the exemption and had simultaneously received a
grant equal to the tax savings. Under this analysis a tax incentive is
only one means of providing government assistance. Other means of
providing government assistance include direct grants, loan guaran-
tees, interest subsidies (which will, of course, become more impor-
tant at the current level of interest rates), state training programs,
state programs to promote research and development, state assistance
in bidding on federal procurement contracts, and programs to de-
velop the state and local infrastructure. Each of these alternatives is
likely to have different distributional and economic effects; the effects
of these alternatives must be compared with the effects of using tax
incentives. Also, a jurisdiction should remember that it can offer
some inducements to business that do not cost money. For example,
outdated building codes can be revised, zoning restrictions can be
re-examined, state and local red tape can be minimized, and om-
budsmen can be appointed.
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Whether tax incentives or any of these alternatives are used, we
still face the same basic question: is the approach working? How do
the benefits compare with the costs? Are the objectives being
achieved? Who is actually benefiting from the assistance being pro-
vided? These are the normal budgetary questions that we ask about
any spending program. Unfortunately, because the use of tax incen-
tives tends to obscure the fact that money is being spent, many of
these questions do not get raised.
Well, I hear my panelists' pencils scratching madly, which is a sig-
nal to me that it is time to turn matters over to them. Obviously, my
list of questions can be extended. In the hopes of having a lively
exchange, I hope that everyone will feel free to attack my list for
being unfair or unrepresentative. Of course, one of the luxuries of
being moderator is that I get to raise all the difficult questions with-
out having to answer any of them.
Roger Vaughan, who has a Ph.D. in Economics and is currently an
Assistant Vice-President in the Economics Department of Citibank of
New York, will begin. He has devoted much of his professional in-
terest to the subject of economic development and fiscal policy.
ROGER VAUGHAN: Thank you very much, it is a pleasure to be here
this morning. A recent editorial in the Wall Street Journal highlight-
ed low business taxes as the major reason for the economic growth in
the sunbelt and high business taxes as one of the reasons that the
Northeast has not faired as well. 1 I would like to take issue with this
view. The belief that taxes are important for local economic develop-
ment has created more problems than it has solved. 2 State and local
taxes have played a very small role in shaping regional growth pat-
terns. Further, I would like to argue that even if we could influence
local development by tinkering with the tax structure, we should
seriously question whether this is an appropriate approach.
There is no doubt that we behave as if state and local taxes affect
economic development. Public development officials tour the country
trying to seduce footloose firms with succulent tax incentives. State
governments are annually lobbied to cut business taxes in order to
provide jobs. Unfortunately, for these development practitioners and
lobbyists, the vast majority of research indicates that low taxes are not
the key to development. The reasons are not hard to find. First, state
1. Adams, Taxbelt Versus Growthbelt, Wall St. J., Sept. 21, 1979, at 18, col. 1 (citing R.
Genetski & Y. Chin, The Impact of State and Local Taxes on Economic Growth (Nov. 3, 1978)
(study published by Harris Trust and Savings Bank, Chicago, Ill.)).
2. See generally R. VAUGHAN, STATE TAXATION AND ECONOMIc DEVELOPMENT (1979).
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and local taxes-which are deductible when computing federal taxa-
ble income-average less than 5% of corporate income, represent a
tiny fraction of the wage bill, and cost less than the energy bill for the
average company.
3
Second, the multistate companies that state development officials
seek can spread their taxable income across so many states that taxes
in any one location further diminish in importance. Third, high taxes
may reflect, though regrettably they do not always reflect a high level
of local public services including educational facilities (from which to
draw the work force), cultural amenities, good transportation, and
water and sewerage facilities. These assets may compensate for the
high tax rate. Fourth, the immigration of footloose firms is not an
important source of local growth. Most local growth comes from
employment expansion in existing companies and from the birth of
new companies. The major difference between New York City and
Houston is the rate at which jobs are created by the growth of new
firms, rather than the contribution of footloose firms. Finally, a large
part of inter-area variations in local property taxes-which are a great-
er burden than state corporate income taxes-is capitalized in the
value of land.
Other factors explain the growth of the sunbelt and the decline of
the frostbelt. These shifts primarily result from the postwar decon-
centration of economic activity and residential settlements. Changes
in technology and the expansion of the national transportation net-
work into rural areas and the South have also played a big role. The
process has been aided by federal grants for roads, flood control,
sewer and water projects, and other federal programs. These grants
reduced the cost of economic and residential expansion in suburban
areas and in new cities. 4 They were not available when older north-
eastern cities were building their own infrastructures. Typically, the
federal tax structure offered more generous incentives for new con-
struction than it did for the rehabilitation of existing structures.5
The importance of these other factors to local development officials
is a recognition that development policy is not simply a question of
offering the right kind of tax incentives. It must encompass a much
broader range of policies, including the training of labor, the de-
velopment of finance programs, and the creation of the appropriate
infrastructure.
3. Id.
4. See generally R. VAUGHAN, THE URBAN IMPACTS OF FEDERAL POLICIES: VOLUME 2,
ECONONIc DEVELOPMENT (1977).
5. See generally Peterson, Federal Tax Policy and Urban Development, in FEDERAL TAX
POLICY AND URBAN DEVELOPMENT (1978).
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This does not overlook the importance of a careful assessment of
state and local spending and the taxes needed to pay for it. Inflation
and expanding social programs have led to an explosion of state and
local spending and a concomitant increase in taxes. We can no
longer tolerate this growth rate. Taxpayers in California and many
other states have demonstrated that they are opposed to the present
high levels of public spending. Certainly, many of those states with
very high tax rates are going to have to reduce tax levels; but, the tax
cuts should not be made to spur development. Taxes should be re-
duced in order to improve the efficiency and the equity of the tax
structure.
There are several guidelines to follow to achieve these goals. First,
some of the tax burden should be shifted from households to busi-
ness. In 1947, personal income taxes and corporate income taxes con-
tributed an equal share to state revenues-about 8%. By 1972, the
share of personal income taxes tripled to almost 22%, while the share
of business income taxes actually declined to 7.4%.6 The taxpayer
revolt is a revolt against personal taxes rather than business taxes.
Second, expanding the use of property tax circuit breakers will im-
prove its equity and assist those most in need of relief. Third, we
should increase the progressivity of income and sales taxes. We also
should insure that business taxes do not burden small enterprises.
We should index the tax structure to allow for the erosion in real
income that inflation causes each year.
We should not cut business taxes, either across the board or
through special tax incentives, simply to encourage development. Nor
should we slash taxes in a way that makes them more regressive, as
many states did in 1979. One of the barriers to designing a rational
tax structure is that we have a short-sighted view of state budgets.
Much of the pressure to cut taxes in 1979 arose because some state
governments ran surpluses. Those surpluses are often mythical. In
some cases, they reflect obligations to pension funds. More impor-
tantly, they reflect the fact that 1978 and 1979 were particularly good
years for the economy. Social service expenditures were low because
the unemployment rate was relatively low. Revenues were high be-
cause of inflation-driven increases in money incomes and property
values. We are headed for a period of slower growth. In 1980, those
same states that slashed sales taxes and cut income taxes will be
forced to restore those taxes which were cut to eliminate programs,
or to rely on the federal government for increased fiscal assistance.
6. TAx FOUNDATION, FAcTs AND FIGURES ON GOVERNMENT FINANCE (20th ed. 1979).
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Rather than view the state budget on an annual basis, it should be
viewed against the overall business cycle. We should be accumulating
a surplus in good years that could be used to maintain the integrity of
state expenditures or to avoid a sudden tax increase during reces-
sions.
Let me summarize what is wrong with cutting taxes to stimulate
development. First, it does not work. Second, it leads to a concentra-
tion on the wrong type of taxes. Business taxes are cut rather than
personal taxes, and often the taxes on large corporations are cut
rather than the taxes on small businesses. It reduces equity. Most of
the state tax incentive programs go to large businesses. They go to
businesses that are new to the area at the expense of those that are
already established in the area. We also increase the regressivity of
household taxes in the process. Finally, it is a myopic policy. Cutting
taxes one year, only to have to raise them the next, is not a rational
fiscal policy.
Let me pose an even more basic question. Even if we could en-
courage local economic growth by slashing state and local taxes,
would we want to do so? The basic question that we must ask is: to
whom should this development be directed? Are we better off if we
can raise the level of local employment by 1% by cutting local expend-
itures by 25%? The reduced expenditures will be felt most by the
poor. The first programs to be pruned are social services and cost of
living increases to welfare recipients. This is done at a time when the
cost of necessities -food, housing, and medical services-is rising at
a more rapid rate than the overall cost of living. But the poor are not
the ones who benefit from any development produced by the tax cut.
We have had enough experience at the national and local level to
realize that the benefits that trickle down are negligible. Therefore,
we must refocus our development policies and realize that, if we set
up an equitable and efficient tax system, most firms and households
can look after themselves. The public sector, in a necessarily reduced
role, should concentrate on helping those who need it.
RICHARD POMP: Thank you for a rather sobering look at the use and
effectiveness of tax incentives. I would like to give the audience a
chance to write down any questions that it might have as the panel
responds to or elaborates on or takes issue with the opinions expres-
sed by Roger and myself.
KENNETH SIMONSON: Until the very end I was a little worried that I
was going to agree with Roger on all points. I am glad to see that that
will not be necessary. I would like to take issue with his last state-
ment: that the trickle-down effect of stimulation and growth is negli-
gible. In fact, I think that the trickle-down may be just what we need
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
SANDRA KANTER: I worry about Roger's reference to the burden of
personal income tax, and his fear that we are creating an environment
for another incentive. Otherwise, I have little disagreement with the
substance of his arguments.
RICHARD POMP: I would like to elaborate on two of Roger's points.
First, whenever we talk about tax incentives at the state level, the
relationship between the federal corporate income tax and the state
corporate income tax must be understood. Most states base their cor-
porate income tax on the federal corporate income tax. Consequently,
these states automatically embrace many of the tax incentives that are
contained in the federal corporate income tax. But, not all of these
tax incentives are necessarily in the interests of a particular state. For
example, should a state allow a firm to reduce its corporate income
tax because of an investment made in another state? If the question is
phrased in this manner, many state officials would answer with a re-
sounding "No." Yet, by basing its corporate income tax on the federal
model, a state implicitly may grant a deduction for accelerated depre-
ciation attributable to investments made out-of-state. A state might
want to re-examine its corporate income tax from this perspective to
determine whether state goals are being undercut.
Second, I would like to emphasize the shift that has been occurring
between the percentage of tax revenue contributed by the federal
corporate income tax and the percentage contributed by the federal
personal income tax. A healthy number of tax incentives for capital
investment now exist at the federal level, 7 and despite perennial cries
of a capital shortage, a serious question can be raised as to whether
the federal tax structure is biased too much in favor of capital invest-
ment. If you are a policymaker in a state that faces a problem of
unemployment, perhaps you should consider offsetting the federal
bias toward capital investment and tilt your state and local tax struc-
ture more toward labor. In that vein, let me ask Roger and the other
panelists for their thoughts on a state tax credit geared towards
employment. For example, how do they feel about a credit that is a
function of the size of a company's payroll, its social security taxes, or
the number of persons it employs?
ROGER VAUGHAN: I am a little nervous about the kind of employment
tax credits that often are proposed. In 1977, the federal government
introduced a program which allowed companies an additional tax
7. OMB, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL
YEAR 1981, Analysis G, at 207 (1980); see also S. Surrey, PATHWAYS TO TAX REFOI (1973).
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write-off for labor costs, provided they increased the size of their
work force.8  In effect, this constituted a subsidy for growth areas
rather than declining areas where it was really needed. I think that
tying an employment tax credit to employment growth is mistargeted.
Most of the tax expenditures will go to areas where the local un-
employment rate is well below the national average. We now have a
policy of targeting these job tax credits-which does not allow a firm
to deduct simply because it increases its work force. Rather, the credit
benefits only those firms that hire certain types of labor-certain
youths under the age of 25, those unemployed for a period not less
than 30 days, and those from poverty households. 9 Another problem
with tax credits is that they tend to be enjoyed more by large
businesses than by small businesses. Many small businesses are not
aware of the programs. The policy, however, is on the right track in
trying to reduce labor costs. Furthermore, interarea differences in
payroll taxes are more important than differences in corporate income
tax rates in explaining disparities in employment growth.
SANDRA KANTER: An employment tax is as dangerous as a corporate
income tax credit. The difference is that less is known about the ef-
fect of the former. For example, several years ago, the Common-
wealth of Massachusetts gave a $500 tax credit to firms that hired
people receiving public assistance or unemployment compensation or
who were in training or rehabilitation programs. 10 In four years, the
state dispensed $15 million worth of employment tax credits. In some
cases the credit was simply misused. One large company saved almost
three-quarters of a million dollars in one year's taxes by putting
a thousand of its employees through a two-week in-house training pro-
gram. Other firms simply ignored the credit until tax time. Such firms
had managers to make decisions about whom to hire. Those decisions
were based on economic judgments about the value of a potential
worker. In a completely separate process, the firms hired tax account-
ants to reduce their tax obligations. They were the ones who looked
at workers' profiles and filed for the appropriate employment tax cred-
its. In other words, employment tax credits do not change firm be-
havior. They merely redistribute revenues from individuals to
businesses.
8. I.R.C. § 44B, 51-53 (amended 1980).
9. Id-
10. MAsS. ANN. LAws ch. 63, § 31(c) (Michie/Law Co-op). See also J. Kittredge, The $500
Tax Credit (1979) (unpublished memorandum of the Massachusetts Equal Opportunity Council
on file with J. Kittredge).
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KENNETH SIMONSON: I think that employment credits, like other
types of tax credits, are quite treacherous for the reasons that Sandra
just outlined. This point is best illustrated not by looking at a tax
credit per se, but by viewing the CETA program. The vast majority
of the employment that occurred in CETA resulted from the dis-
placement of employees who were already there. People were laid off
under one program and hired under another. The same type of dis-
placement- occurs under an employment tax credit, but it is probably
more difficult to see. This type of issue pervades tax debates concern-
ing the incidence of a tax or the effectiveness of an incentive. I do not
think that we will ever have a definitive answer to the question. I
base my reaction more on a gut feeling and hope that the studies
pointed to are reliable in their methodology.
RICHARD POMP: Let me pursue one of Roger's other points. The state
and local tax structure must be viewed as a family of taxes, and thus a
balance must be struck in the reliance placed on various tax bases.
For example, Connecticut does not have a broad-based personal in-
come tax. In many quarters, the absence of an income tax is viewed
as making Connecticut a tax haven for business. Many persons oppose
the introduction of a personal income tax on the grounds that it
would increase the cost of doing business within the state by fueling
labor's demands for salary increases. The absence of an income tax is
often singled out as the key to attracting business from New York.
Because Connecticut does not have a personal income tax, however,
it has one of the highest excise taxes on gasoline, liquor, and cigar-
ettes. Certainly the levels of these taxes raise the cost of doing business
in the state and, I would suspect, also are reflected in the level of
salaries paid within the state.
If a state is going to forgo the use of a major tax, such as an income
tax, then pressure will be exerted to reduce services. A low level of
services may result in businesses providing those services which are
supplied publicly in other jurisdictions. For example, businesses may
spend more on educating and training their work force because too
little is spent on education by the public sector. A firm may supply
its own police and fire protection because it cannot rely on the level
of protection offered publicly. A business may pay for its own garbage
disposal because such service is not provided by the local jurisdiction.
In other words, if low taxes mean a low level of public services, then
low taxes also may mean higher business costs.
ROGER VAUGHAN: One common question is: If taxes are not impor-
tant why do all businesses say that they are? There are a number of
surveys addressed to business managers that found that taxes are im-
portant, especially for companies moving out of the area. In addition,
1980]
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there have been many surveys that found that taxes were less impor-
tant than other factors, such as local government red tape-the diffli-
culty of getting the appropriate planning permission or zoning
changes, the availability of skilled labor, the uninterruptible energy,
and the adequacy transportation." Businesses will acknowledge the
importance of taxes, just as any lobby group will insist that it needs
an increase in allocations from particular federal, state, or local prog-
rams. That is the way the political system works.
In reference to the issue of tax incentives for employment, we
would be much better off abolishing all tax incentives and concentrat-
ing on the overall tax structure. Tax incentives have the unfortunate
attribute of not being regarded as part of state and local expenditures,
and thus tax incentives are not budgeted or evaluated. Some states
publish a review of tax expenditures. Michigan, California, and Mary-
land, for example, systematically evaluate their tax programs. North
Carolina just started doing the same. The elimination of incentives
and an examination of the overall tax structure will lead to far more
effective and equitable federal, state, and local fiscal policies.
RICHARD POMP: In light of that last point, it is ironic that while state
budgets are being scrutinized to identify any item that can be re-
duced, and while states are rushing to impose limitations on spend-
ing, a whole range of expenditures escapes this same scrutiny and
these same limitations simply because such expenditures occur
through the tax system. Indeed, as more states adopt spending limita-
tions, the pressure to spend money through tax expenditures may
increase.
Since 1974, the federal government has published a tax expendi-
ture budget. The most recent budget indicates that the federal gov-
ernment still spends about $150 billion through the tax system. 12
Only a few states compile their own tax expenditure budgets, even
though such an undertaking obviously would be extremely produc-
tive.
In response to the last question asked of Roger, I will share with
you a recent article from the Wall Street Journal.13 The article is
about the increasing use of tax incentives. At one point it dicusses
Ohio's grant of a $60,000 per year tax abatement in order to attract
Church and Dwight Company's new $20 million plant. According to
11. See R. VAUGHAN, supra note 4.
12. OMB, SPECIAL ANALYSES, BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT FISCAL
YEAn 1981, Analysis G, at 207 (1980).
13. Alsop, Amendment Debate, Wall St. J., June 30, 1978, at 1, col. 6.
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the Ohio economic development official involved, "The tax incentive
was the keystone of the deal." At the same time, Church and
Dwight's controller had a different perspective: "The tax abatement
was a nice kicker at the end, but we chose Ohio mainly because of its
strategic location for distribution and market growth." State officials
obviously want to believe that the abatements are a major factor in a
company's decision to locate within a given area, but the picture that
emerges from the company may be quite different. Is it so difficult to
understand that firms will bargain for whatever they can get, whether
it makes any critical difference or not? To some firms, that strategy is
just sound business practice.
ROGER VAUGHAN: Another issue to consider is whether a progressive
state personal income tax system with a high marginal rate acts as a
disincentive to business investment. The answer is yes. Several
studies have shown that high state and local personal burdens are
capitalized in high wages. 14 The wage rate represents a larger part of
the company's cost than direct state and local business taxes. The
issue here, however, is whether we should try to moderate public
spending and reduce all taxes. We should not cut taxes selectively for
certain groups.
KENNETH SIMONSON: Thank you Richard. It is not often that I have a
chance to make two disclaimers before I begin a talk. I am not speak-
ing now for the Chamber of Commerce of the United States, nor am
I speaking for Arnold Cantor of the AFL-CIO, who originally was
going to participate in this program. The Chamber of Commerce of
the United States deals almost exclusively with national policy issues
that affect Congress and the Administration. The thrust of my work
with the Chamber has involved federal taxation. I think, however
that many of the issues that I deal with there carry over into this
morning's discussion.
I agree with Roger and Richard that it is important to look at the
overall level of taxation and not concentrate on particular business tax
incentives. I think that personal taxes can be just as important, or
perhaps more important, in affecting the decisions, not just of a firm,
but of the individuals who, after all, provide the real economic de-
velopment that we now are addressing. If you have all kinds of tax
incentives for business, but compensate for those by imposing ex-
tremely high or punitive taxes on all certain categories of individuals,
14. See, e.g., R. Goldfarb & A. Yezer, Evaluating Alternative Theories of Intercity and
Interregional Wage Differentials, 16 J. REGIONAL SCIENCES 345 (1976); 0. Izraeli, Differentials
in Nominal wages and Prices Between Cities (Aug. 31, 1973) (unpublished thesis at University
of Chicago library).
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you are likely to encounter economic development problems that will
be just as severe as if you allowed businesses to be more heavily
taxed.
This point cannot be stressed too strongly: you must be concerned
about the overall level of taxation. At the same time, I do not think
that you can rest all of your hopes for economic development on that
one factor. If all state taxes were abolished, you would not find every
business in the country flocking to your door. In fact, there is no
detectible correlation between the growth rate of personal income per
capita in states as a whole and the growth rate of their taxes. I did try
running a correlation on this and found that there was a slight nega-
tive relationship (that is, if taxes per capita increased, growth de-
creased), but it was statistically insignificant. This result can be
explained by recognizing that taxes are only one side of the picture.
You also have to look at the level of services that the state and local
governments provide.
This leads to an equally important point: the tax system cannot, to
any great degree, be used for either stimulating economic develop-
ment or achieving other social policy aims. I think that it is particu-
larly hazardous to try to make a state or local tax system overly redis-
tributive. By having an excessively progressive tax system, people at
the upper end of the income scale are encouraged either to move out
of the cities and states and commute or to leave the area altogether.
Such a result can be a very important element in setting the business
climate for a state. Furthermore, I think that redistribution is an in-
appropriate goal of state taxation policy. Redistribution has to be ac-
complished at the federal level. State tax policy should be concerned
almost exclusively with neutrality or efficiency in raising revenue.
Therefore, you need to concentrate on what Colbert, Louis XIV's
finance minister, called "plucking the goose to get the most feathers
with the least squawk." You want to try to make tax administration as
painless and as fair as possible. You do not want to create a feeling
among business or individual taxpayers, that they are being penalized
while someone else is getting off lightly. This is often a problem that
the federal government has to contend with. This may be one reason
why there is more concern now with non-compliance. I think that it
is one variable that is making some federal policymakers consider a
value-added tax as a substitute for corporate, personal income, or
payroll taxes.
Michigan has a form of value-added tax called the single business
tax. 15 Other states have not been overly enthusiastic about adopting
• 15. Single Business Tax Act of 1975, MiCH. Comp. LAvs § 201.1 (1970). For an excellent
evaluation of the single-business tax, see ADVISORY COMM'N. ON INTERCOVERNMENTAL RELA-
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this or the business activities tax that Michigan imposed from 1953 to
1967. The Michigan tax has many problems, and I certainly am not
here to recommend that any state presently adopt it. It does have a
significant advantage, however, in that in its ideal form-that is, with
a minimum of exemptions and a very broad base-a value-added tax
may be perceived as being a fairer and more neutral tax. It does
discriminate between capital and labor, incorporated and unincorpor-
ated businesses, firms that rely heavily on turnover and firms that
are more integrated through several stages of production. A value-
added tax can resolve many of the problems created by having a var-
iety of state taxes, such as a corporate income tax-which may heavily
discriminate against capital-and smaller state taxes, which may add
up to a much bigger nuisance than a revenue source. The value-
added tax is not necessarily a solution to the problems of financing
state government or the problems of providing tax incentives. It can
help, however, to achieve what should be the primary goal of in-
creased neutrality, efficiency, and perceived effectiveness in tax col-
lection.
In some states, there is a great temptation to capitalize on what the
states see as a form of natural monopoly; for instance, to use sever-
ence taxes in states that have a scarce resource such as oil or natural
gas. To take a somewhat more exotic example, Kentucky had a distill-
ed spirits production tax that was levied on distillers of Kentucky
bourbon, blended whiskey, gin, and vodka. 16 An interesting study
found that the tax did not perceptibly discourage production of Ken-
tucky bourbon. 17 However, the tax drove production of the other
liquors out of Kentucky and into other states. The study also noted
that the growth of increase in the consumption of bourbon was much
slower than the increase in the consumption of other beverages. The
study wisely refrained from attributing the decline of bourbon drink-
ing to the distillers tax alone. There is a warning, however, implicit
in this illustration: even a seemingly safe tax levied on a tax base that
appears secure is only a short-run solution.. It will (1) encourage the
development of substitutes in production processes that may lead to
shifting production out of the state, and (2) encourage consumption of
substitutes or discourage consumption of the product that is the sub-
TIONS, THE MICHIGAN SINGLE BUSINESS TAX: A DIFFERENT APPROACH TO STATE BUSINESS
TAXATION (1978).
16. C. Garrison & D. Soule, Economic Effects of Kentucky's Distilled Spirits Production
Tax, 20 NAT'L TAX J. 20 (1967).
17. Id. at 21-22.
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ject of the state tax. That is the small warning that I would like to
raise concerning the negative aspect of tax disincentives.
SANDRA KANTER: Perhaps I can make a few important comments. I
have spent the last few years studying the formation of economic pol-
icy in the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. One of the matters that
is being assessed is the formation of the state's tax policy. In the
course of this research, I interviewed a number of state legislators
about their views on economic legislation. The results were fascinat-
ing. For example, the most liberal legislators-those who support
freedom of abortion, gay rights, and increased public spending-
were asked their position on the use of tax incentives as tools for
economic development. They wholeheartedly supported their use.
Not surprisingly, almost every legislator interviewed believed that the
strategy of lower taxes could be used to induce development. And yet
we, as experts, unanimously agree that they have little effect on
economic activity. What is happening? Why do public officials sup-
port programs that experts agree will not work?
With the exception of revenue bonds, which were first issued in
the South, most tax incentives originated in the northeastern part of
the country. They have been around for a long time. In fact, the
Commonwealth of Massachusetts provided the first incentive in the
17th century. Over the years, older industrialized states have tended
to be the ones that proposed new business incentives. These states
also have a declining manufacturing base and, concurrently, high
energy, transportation, resource, and building costs. This declining
manufacturing base was once much healthier. Many of the firms so
classified are no longer competitive. One way for them to survive
temporarily is to reduce their cost of doing business.
For years, the same companies have been developing relationships
with state legislators and state bureaucrats. In the beginning, they
used their influence at the capitol to ask for outright tax reductions,
but public officials found it difficult to support business tax reductions
during periods when personal income taxes were rising. Con-
sequently, the declining sector changed strategies, and in the 1940's
and 50's it began to request tax incentives-hidden tax reductions
camouflaged as special-purpose tax deductions or credits. Because tax
incentives are not understood by the public and, consequently, are
more politically acceptable than across-the-board reductions, business
was more successful in getting tax incentives passed in the various
state legislatures.
State economies have more than just declining sectors. There usu-
ally is a growing sector of the economy. In places such as California
and Massachusetts, services and high technology are expanding
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quickly. What do growing companies need most? The answer is not
tax incentives. Rather, they need roads and pipelines and vocational
education schools. They want programs that make it easier to get skil-
led personnel. These growing firms, however, have not been around
a long time. They have not built up a long-term relationship with
state officials. Thus, they are not as successful as the older, marginal
firms in getting the state to implement programs that serve their par-
ticular purposes.
There are three dangers to this scenario. First, businesses have
ever-expanding tentacles. They are always asking for more. States
begin competing with each other. A built-in frenzy develops in which
each state wants to be the most able to please business. Yet business
has no positive effect on the economy. Second, the process is a zero-
sum game. Nobody wins, everyone loses-everyone except for the
marginal corporation. Marginal corporations use tax incentives to stay
in business a few more months, maybe even a few more years. Fi-
nally, the economic policy is irrational. We are concentrating our
energies on helping firms that are not competitive at the expense of
reducing expansion in the growing sectors. This is not only ineffec-
tive, but also may accelerate the decline of the older industrial states.
KENNETH SIMONSON: I would like to respond to Sandra and also to a
question. The question reads, "It has often been said that corporate
taxes are really paid by customers and clients when they buy a com-
pany's goods and services; is the corporate tax, in any form, just a
governmental convenience which uses the corporation as tax collector
rather than the taxpayer?"
No; the corporate income tax falls largely on capital. Perhaps it falls
only on corporate stockholders, but, in the long run, it is spread
among all capital owners. I choose to bring this up now, in response
to Sandra's last statement, to reiterate that many tax incentives are
irrational economic policy in as much as they subsidize marginal, fail-
ing firms while penalizing both successful enterprises and the indi-
vidual taxpayer. The converse is that there are many taxes now that
do act as a disincentive. The corporate income tax is probably the
worst disincentive that we have in our entire tax system because it
does fall strictly on capital. It discourages corporate investment, and
it may lead to over-investment in other sectors, particularly housing.
A state needs to examine very carefully what the overall impact of an
entire tax is. The state should devote more attention to getting rid of
an onerous tax than to patching it up with an incentive which will just
attract the footloose or failing firms.
RICHARD POTMP: I am far less confident than Ken about the incidence
of the corporate income tax-a hotly contested issue. For example,
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does the burden of the corporate tax fall on shareholders, the owners
of all capital, or on consumers, suppliers, or employees? This con-
troversy over income tax also has as its counterpart the taxation of
property. For years the orthodox view was that the property tax was
regressive in its incidence. In the last few years, however, economists
have reexamined the traditional doctrines and now raise the question
of whether the property tax in fact might not be progressive. The
only safe conclusion to draw from all of this controversy is that we
know dreadfully little about the economic effects of many taxes.
This lack of knowledge places policymakers in a difficult position.
What should they assume about the incidence of a tax when deciding
which taxes should be raised or lowered? My own feeling is that,
given this uncertainty, policymakers should avoid placing all their
eggs in one basket. In other words, because so little is known about
the effects of taxation, we should allocate the risk of uncertainty and
strive for a balanced tax structure, rather than rely too heavily on any
one tax.
In response to one of Ken's other points, I have great difficulty in
concluding that the federal- corporate tax does not favor capital in-
vestment. Investment tax credits, accelerated depreciation, special
rates on capital gains, DISC, percentage depletion, and similar provi-
sions all favor capital investment. In addition, the rate of the corpo-
rate income tax has been reduced over the past few years. The tax
expenditure budget contains estimates of the revenue lost due to
these special provisions.
I disagree with Ken on another point. A state or local jurisdiction
cannot avoid facing the distributional effects of its tax structure. Each
major tax, whether income, sales, or property, has different distribu-
tional effects. In deciding which tax should be adopted, increased, or
reduced, a state or local jurisdiction cannot ignore the equity implica-
tions that these changes may raise. To be sure, a redistribution of
income is probably best handled at the federal level and is probably
better handled through direct expenditures rather than through taxa-
tion. Indeed, some would argue that it is not feasible for small juris-
dictions or even cities to impose progressive income tax. It would
simply drive wealthier individuals to other jurisdictions and leave the
city with a higher concentration of poor. Of course, the relationship
between taxation and an individual's decision to move is just a subset
of this morning's whole discussion. My point, however, is that a
jurisdiction cannot simply ignore the distributional consequences of
its tax system.
Ken also raises the issue of neutrality. To extol neutrality as a goal
means that the tax system should not interfere with the existing allo-
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cation of resources. In effect, the adoption of neutrality as a goal
means that we are satisfied with the existing distribution of income. If
we are unhappy about the existing distribution of income, neutrality
should not necessarily be a tax goal, because taxation can serve as a
tool for redistribution.
Finally, I have a few comments on the value-added tax. In my
judgment, the value-added tax is an alternative means of collecting a
retail sales tax. Other countries have adopted a VAT for reasons that
are unique to their history. The present debate in this country over a
value-added tax should really be divided into two questions: should
the United States adopt a federal tax on consumption? If so, should
that tax be collected in stages, as is true of a value-added tax, or only
at the time of actual sale, the way our state sales taxes are collected?
ROGER VAUGHAN: I would like to respond with a few quick points.
First, I agree that the tax system is not a very good way to shift
resources from those who can pay to those that need assistance.
Targeting public expenditures is a much more effective way of achiev-
ing that objective. Second, the trouble with tax incentives is that they
are easy to offer. Perhaps we need some federal policies that discour-
age local incentives. The federal government could attach a penalty to
revenue sharing or reduce grants to localities that offer excessive tax
incentives. This would require localities to actually document how
much they are giving away through these incentives. A firm that
moves into a town is not a free good. It needs services such as water
supply, transportation, and waste disposal. It contributes to the wear
and tear of the local infrastructure. These costs will be met through
taxes paid by other firms. Thus, a successful tax incentive attracts
new firms but drives other firms out.
Third, while at least part of the corporate income tax falls on capi-
tA, there also are many taxes, such as personal income and payroll
taxes, that fall on labor. The object of the tax system should be to
even out the tax burden on different factors of production to reduce
the inefficiency cost of taxes. There are two issues relevant to New
York. First, have taxes caused job loss in New York? Yes, undoubt-
edly taxes have played a role. I do not claim that high business taxes
have had no impact at all. They have not contributed to the deterio-
ration of the business climate in such high taxing locales as New York
City, but other taxes have been much more important. Of course
taxes affect business. They influence investment and labor supply de-
cisions. We must not, however, attribute some mysterious economic
power to high taxes. Taxes reflect the price of public services. Some
areas are able to supply public services at a relatively low cost. Those
areas will be attractive to businesses and residents. But returning to
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my basic question: are we really shaping development for business or
are we trying to do something to address problems of market imper-
fections and equity? I think that we tend to ignore the equity issue
when we start talking about taxes. We think that any development is
good. We are redistributing resources, and the redistribution process
will slow growth. But that is the price we must pay for assisting the
poor.
Another pertinent issue is: what can be done about the difference
in tax rates between cities and suburbs? Central cities spend a lot
more per capita on redistributive public services than do suburbs.
This leads to higher taxes. This disparity has contributed to the sub-
urbanization of business and the population. The appropriate re-
sponse does not involve cutting out central city services to low in-
come groups. The state government must step in and provide fiscal
assistance. The burden of helping the poor must be shared by all
households. State governments have failed to target effective fiscal
assistance to the jurisdictions that need it. States that do have some
kind of tax sharing program distribute resources among jurisdictions
based on population. This is scarcely an effective way to help the
areas that need it.
One final issue requires an examination of the effectiveness of fed-
eral, state and local tax incentives, as well as the incentives used in
other countries. Most of the discussion about local tax incentives is
also applicable to federal incentives. Rather than subsidize these mis-
targeted programs, such as the marginal employment tax credit, the
federal government should reduce taxes for all firms and households.
There are many steps that can be taken at all levels of government to
improve the efficiency and equity of taxation. In order to reduce ex-
penditures, we have to reevaluate the object of their efforts.
SANDRA KANTER: The danger of the 1980's will arise from the general
agreement that tax incentives are detrimental and, therefore, that the
personal income tax should be reduced. Reducing state personal in-
come taxes, however, is not going to determine whether a firm lo-
cates here or there. If Roger is right and taxes are shifted onto wages,
then business should be advocating a graduated income tax.
I have a quick question from somebody in the audience: "Do only
weak or marginal companies favor tax incentives?" Marginal firms like
tax incentives. .Other firms might be interested in obtaining tax incen-
tives, but state tax incentives play no part in their location or growth
decisions. Why spend money on something that is going to be done
anyway? The use of tax measures is a very dangerous policy in the
long run.
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KENNETH SIMONSON: I think that Sandra's last point is a very good
one. The goal should be to provide the right climate for the economy
as a whole, rather than to save a particular firm. Therefore, a tax
program should not be tailored to a particular firm or a particular
industry. You really must consider the trickle-down possibilities. I
think that the investment tax credit on the federal level, far from
being a tax expenditure, has been quite an effective incentive to in-
creasing national productivity. If you review the list of tax expendi-
tures, you will find that most of the expenditures relating to capital
actually represent a reduction in the tax system's very strong bias
against capital. The term "tax expenditures" is basically rhetorical. It
overlooks the fact that these provisions either mitigate a bias against
capital in general or reduce a bias against one kind of capital in par-
ticular. For instance, if you look at accelerated depreciation strictly in
terms of how the productive capacity of a particular piece of equip-
ment declines over its useful life, you might say that accelerated de-
preciation allows excessive write-offs in the early years. The relevant
comparison, however, is with the replacement cost of that investment
and the time when the asset would be replaced absent tax considera-
tions. When that question is asked, you find that accelerated depre-
ciation in its present form is an inadequate incentive in many cases.
We need a wholesale reform of the depreciation system. The Jones-
Conable bill,' 8 provides for a ten year accelerated write-off for busi-
ness structures, a five year accelerated write-off for equipment, and a
three year accelerated write-off for $100,000 of investment in autos
and light trucks. It represents a good first step. The Chamber worked
actively to develop a compromise for reforming depreciation that
would satisfy major business groups. This legislation would help large
and small businesses in all industries, not just capital-intensive indus-
tries. Finally, I think that it would not only benefit business, but the
entire work force.,
This is where trickle-down comes into play again. Once you have a
more rational and balanced system for taxing all returns to income,
you will have greater savings and a more productive capital stock that
will translate very quickly into higher wage payments and a higher
standard of living for everyone. I do not believe that there is a free
lunch, in the sense that an investment tax credit or depreciation re-
form necessarily raises the overall level of federal revenues above the
level maintained prior to the reduction. There will be, however, very
18. H.R. 4646, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); S. 1435, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
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substantial feedback along those lines. Not only will this compensate
for some of the initial revenue loss, it will also leave a healthier and
more competitive economy. The message to state and federal gov-
ernments is clear. You need to reduce the prejudice against invest-
ment in your tax system without trying to concentrate that reduction
on one particular firm or industry.
RICHARD POMP: Defining a tax expenditure is not an impossible task.
As a working definition, one could define a tax expenditure as any
provision in the tax code that is used to achieve a goal that is ex-
traneous to the normative structure of the income tax. Although it is
often difficult to reach a consensus on the normative structure of the
income tax, many tax expenditures can be readily identified. Con-
sider, for example, the home insulation credit. Obviously granting
individuals a tax reduction for insulating their homes has nothing to
do with the normative structure of an income tax. Identifying the
insulation credit as a tax expenditure, however, does not mean that
the credit is necessarily bad. It simply means that the credit has no
necessary or logical relationship to an income tax. By identifying the
credit as a tax expenditure, we are reminded to ask the normal
budgetary questions, i.e., how much money is being spent, how is
this money being distributed, and are the desired goals and objec-
tives being reached. After raising those questions, we might conclude
that the high price of heating oil already provides the necessary in-
centive for homeowners to insulate. We might also conclude that a
bottleneck exists on the supply side such that, if the credit increases
demand, the only short-term effect will be an increase in the price of
insulation. If the price does rise, the credit inures to the benefit of
only a few manufacturers. This kind of analysis, however, is seldom
undertaken when a tax expenditure, as opposed to equivalent spend-
ing program, is adopted.
I also have a few responses to the comments made about deprecia-
tion. In many cases the depreciation allowances that a taxpayer claims
may have little bearing to reality. For example, useful lives for tax
purposes are often shorter than economic lives, and estimates of sal-
vage value for tax purposes are often lower, especially under inflation-
ary conditions. In the case of the ADR (asset depreciation
range)-which big businesses use for purposes of the federal corpo-
rate income tax and also use for any state corporate income tax that is
modeled on the federal tax-the useful lives are much shorter than
the actual economic rate of depreciation.
Ken shifts focus a bit by talking about replacement cost deprecia-
tion. In my mind, depreciation is merely a means of allocating the
historic cost of an asset in order to make a proper determination of
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
income. Replacement cost depreciation is really part of a much larger
problem: what adjustments, if any, should occur in a tax system to
account for inflation? Actually, we have made such adjustments in the
federal income tax on an ad hoc basis, i.e., raising the personal
exemption to $1,000 and raising the zero bracket amount.' 9 If you
want the tax system to be adjusted automatically, I suggest that we
should not start by focusing on the owners of capital assets. Proposing
replacement-cost depreciation or inflation adjustments in the calcula-
tion of capital gains, for example, strikes me as a means of granting
relief to many persons who have actually gained from, rather than
been injured by, inflation. Consider how the owners of capital assets
have fared compared with the holders of cash. In addition, consider
that industries often purchase capital assets with borrowed money,
which becomes cheaper to pay back under inflationary conditions.
The whole topic of inflation and the income tax is incredibly complex.
A full discussion of the issue would take us far afield.
20
I would like to make a few other short responses to some earlier
points that were raised. The business community is not united behind
the Jones-Conable bill, which is now before Congress. 2 ' Smaller
businesses are not quite as enthusiastic as they once were because
they realize they would be better off with alternative approaches.
This bill is really just part of a much larger debate over the existence
of a capital shortage in the .United States. I think that the fear of a
capital shortage will permeate much of the debate over tax changes in
the coming decade. Unfortunately, critical analysis of the issue is long
overdue.
Regarding the comments made on the multiplier effect of new bus-
iness, my response is "it depends on the situation." For example, if a
jurisdiction merely attracts the branch office of a multistate or a mul-
tinational corporation, the multiplier effect would be rather modest.
Each situation, however, must be examined individually.
When evaluating the city versus suburb issue, keep in mind that
federal policies for many years, intentionally or unintentionally,
helped create the suburbs. For example, federal funds for highways,
a pro-suburb FHA mortgage policy, and deductions for property taxes
and mortgage interest all encouraged home ownership and the growth
of the suburbs.
19. See I.R.C. §§ 1, 151.
20. For a complete discussion, see BROOKINGS INST., INFLATION AND THE INCOME TAX (H.
Aaron ed. 1976).
21. H.R. 4646, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979); S. 1435, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. (1979).
1980]
230 THE AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 29:207
ROGER VAUGHAN: Several questions have been raised concerning
what should be done about Chrysler. The Chrysler debate illustrates
many of the typical false arguments for government assistance. Some
people believe that, if we collect taxes from the State of Michigan, or
from the entire nation, and use those resources to provide money for
Chrysler, we will somehow save jobs. There are probably several au-
tomobile firms worldwide that would be happy to purchase some of
Chrysler's auto production facilities or to enter into some type of
agreement with Chrysler. That would mobilize world capital to
restructure the firm instead of using taxes to keep an inefficiently
managed company alive. I think Chrysler is a very clear example of a
situation where the use of tax incentives is an inappropriate response
to threatened job loss.
Another issue is how the tax burden should be apportioned at the
state and local level between business and individuals? There is no
simple answer. We do not know enough about tax incidence to calcu-
late how the burden of business tax is shared among the consumers of
the goods, the stockholders of the company or even the workers of
the firm. We are not aiming for some type of utopian tax system. We
can only hope to identify the real inefficiencies and change the taxes
accordingly.
My final statements will address the issue of the Harris Bank
Study, a study conducted by Genetski and Chin, that assesses how
tax burdens have affected income growth in different states. 22 The
study, which was the basis of a series of editorials in the Wall Street
Journal, concluded that high taxes significantly deter employment
growth. There are problems with the study, but I think such prob-
lems are encountered in every tax study. It is very difficult to analyze
the relationship between taxes and employment growth, company
birth rates, personal income growth, or some other growth measure-
ment. The problem is that it is difficult to assess the true local tax
.burden on business in a given location. If you use the corporate in-
come tax rate, an explanatory variable in many studies, then tax in-
centives and other special allowances are ignored. The effective tax
rate is often very different from the nominal tax rate. All of these
studies have a fundamental flaw-they use inaccurate measures of
the time-tax rate. All one can conclude is that the vast majority of
studies find that taxes are not important.
RICHARD POMP: Here is a question from the audience: "Is the
battlefield moving from the state and local arena to the international
22. See R. Genetski & Y. Chin, The Impact of State and Local Taxes on Economic Growth,
(Nov. 3, 1978) (study published by Harris Trust and Savings Bank, Chicago, I11.).
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arena? What part do state and local taxes play in international taxa-
tion?" To answer this question, I will begin by pointing to the recent
debate that took place over the proposed United States tax treaty
with the United Kingdom.2 3 Article 9 of this treaty would have pre-
vented states from applying what is called the "unitary method of
taxation." Basically, the unitary method of taxation refers to a system
whereby a state, for purposes of taxation, does not respect all of the
subsidiary corporations that make up a large multistate or multina-
tional corporation. California is the major proponent of this method of
taxation. In certain cases, California will pierce all of the corporate
veils and treat a multinational firm as if it had no subsidiaries.2 4 In
other words, California will tax the corporation and its subsidiaries as
if they were a unified entity. This approach creates many problems in
international tax planning, because it undercuts the use of tax havens
and dummy corporations.
The IRS uses a contrary approach, called the "arm's-length ap-
proach."25  The IRS respects the existence of foreign corporations
and examines the transactions that take place between a United
States corporation and its foreign subsidiaries to ensure that each
transaction is recorded at a bona fide price. But how can the IRS
police the price at which IBM transfers technology from the parent
corporation to one of its subsidiaries? There are many provisions in
the Federal tax code that are meant to control this transfer pricing
problem and to undercut the use of tax havens and dummy corpora-
tions. 26  Nonetheless, such games are played, and the dollars in-
volved are quite large. By completely disregarding the existence of a
corporation's foreign subsidiaries, California avoids many of the prob-
lems that plague the IRS.
The issue in the proposed treaty with the United Kingdom was
whether California could continue applying its unitary approach.
23. Convention Between the Government of the United States of America and the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland for the Avoidance of Dou-
ble Taxation and the Prevention of Fiscal Evasion with Respect to Taxes on Income and Capital
Gains, reprinted in SENATE COMM. ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, TAX CONVENTION WITH THE
UNITED KINGDOM OF GREAT BRITAIN AND NORTHERN IRELAND, S. EXEC. REP. No. 18, 95th
Cong., 2d Sess. 54 (1978).
24. See R. Pomp & F. Church, The Unitary Method: Thirteen Questions and Answers, 10
TAx NOTES 891 (1980).
25. I.R.C. § 482. See R. Pomp & F. Church, supra note 24; Note, Multinational Corpora-
tions and Income Allocation Under Section 482 of the Internal Revenue Code, 89 HARV. L.
REv. 1202 (1976).
26. Id.
27. When first proposed, Art. 9(4) of the treaty restricted use of the unitary tax methods by
the states. Article 9(4), however, was dropped from the final treaty. See 124 CONG. REc. 9838
(1978); R. Pomp & F. Church, supra note 24.
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Many persons were outraged that Congress tried to determine state
tax policies through the treaty-making process, basically because it
cuts off state input. The whole problem of state taxation of multistate
and multinational corporations is a difficult one and a solution will be
found only after considerable compromise by all parties concerned.
Unfortunately, tax treaty negotiations are not the proper setting in
which to reach that compromise.
SANDRA KANTER: One quick question: If we are all in agreement,
how do we convince the state legislature? This is a really difficult
issue for state legislatures. I am convinced that you cannot isolate
states and convince them to reduce their tax incentives. You have got
to have a coalition, such as the Multistate Tax Commission, before
reform can occur.
KENNETH SIMONSON: I also was asked to respond about Chrysler and
about indexing. I agree with Roger about Chrysler. I do not think it
is appropriate to quickly enact new tax incentives to save this one
firm. It established a very bad precedent at the local, state, or federal
level. I suspect that the decision as to whether Chrysler stays in bus-
iness in its present form, reorganizes, or closes down will be made
regardless of whether tax incentives are brought into play.
With respect to indexing, I have serious reservations about it, and
my endorsement of more accelerated depreciation and my discussion
of replacement value do not rest simply on the idea that the cost of
assets continues to rise and that something should be done about it.
Rather, the technological obsolescence associated with nearly all fixed
assets which the present tax code does not recognize properly is far
more important. Ideally you would expense all capital investments.
Failing that, there should be substantially more accelerated deprecia-
tion even if our inflation rate miraculously drops to zero. As for using
a standardized, simplified depreciation system in place of our present
one, this also would benefit small business. Only a minute fraction of
small businesses are now able to take advantage of the asset deprecia-
tion range because the provisions and restrictions attending it are so
complex and the paperwork requirements so daunting that most small
businesses stay with the simple system instead of the most advan-
tageous system available under law. The 10-5-3 plan would be a vast
improvement over the present method currently facing small busines-
ses. Although it is true that there is no unanimity among business
groups, one of the earliest backers of the 10-5-3 plan was the National
Federation of Independent Business, the largest small business as-
sociation.
In general, indexing does have some attractions. The state and fed-
eral governments should not be benefiting unduly from inflation.
ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT
They should be forced to look at their priorities every year and de-
cide what services really ought to be provided and at what level. The
notion that there will be a sudden slash in services if taxes are cut
should not necessarily intimidate taxpayers. In many cases it would
be more appropriate to have services provided privately than by the
state or local government. The isolated cases in which municipal ser-
vices are provided privately demonstrate that there is good reason to
encourage this course of action. In Scottsdale, Arizona, for instance,
fire protection is provided by a private company. A number of studies
show that private firms provide more innovative and less costly fire
protection than the standard municipal fire department.28 Similar
examples can be found with respect to a wide range of services pro-
vided by the government. General Accounting Office and other gov-
ernment studies show that contracting out or using performing ser-
vices in-house would be far more cost-effective.
This is a lengthy response to the question of whether we need
indexing. I think that indexing is one way to assure that governments
do not expand without limitation and unduly benefit from inflation.
At least at the federal level, it is more appropriate to have Congress
regularly assess how the entire tax system should be structured. In-
dexing would eliminate some of the current impetus for doing this.
On the state level, however, indexing may be more appropriate.
28. See, e.g., ADVOCACY TASK GROUP ON GOVT. COMPETITION WITH SMALL BUSINESS,
U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION, GOVERNMENT COMPETITION: A THREAT TO SMALL
BUSINESS (1980).
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